VyOS Platform Blog

VyOS Project June & July 2026 Update

Written by Daniil Baturin | July 28, 2026 10:45:00 AM Z

Hello, Community!

The June and July development update is here. Over the past two months, the VyOS team focused on security and compliance enhancements, community-driven improvements, platform updates, and customer engagement. 

On the security side, we laid the groundwork for FIPS compliance, added post-quantum key exchange to IPsec, and started publishing SBOM artifacts for full supply-chain transparency. The community also stepped in with some hard-won fixes, from a zone-based firewall bug in VRF configurations to a route-target quirk that was causing needless traffic interruptions on every commit. 

Security and Compliance Enhancements

The network is the backbone of the IT infrastructure, and keeping it secure is one of the core requirements to protect everything else. VyOS has always taken this seriously, and now you can use some of the products of our commitment to security.

One of the core requirements for deployments in regulated environments and corporate networks where security is strictly policed is using products that provide adherence to established security frameworks and standards. One of the most well-known and most widely requested by users is FIPS. The process of certifying products for FIPS compliance is a long and bumpy road, but we are firmly on it, and you can already start using some of the building blocks now.

For example, you can flip a switch for OpenSSL and put it into FIPS mode. It is important to understand what this switch really does: it does not certify anything or make anything compliant - it restricts. With the switch enabled, OpenSSL is limited to the FIPS provider, and all algorithms, modes, and features that are not FIPS-compatible are excluded from use. Since OpenSSL is one of the core cryptographic libraries in the system and is used by a lot of services, this restriction automatically propagates to many of them, for example:

  • Web services - the API in the first place.
  • haproxy
  • SNMP
  • DHCP server
  • syslog
  • PKI and automatic certificate management
  • stunnel

And a lot of components that are less externally visible. As you can see, the impact is significant. You may activate OpenSSL FIPS mode with a single command in the configuration:

set system option fips

In future changes, more system components will be connected to this switch, and the same exclusion of non-FIPS-compatible cryptography will cover them automatically.

Pay attention - this switch is not FIPS compliance in any form, and you should not rely on it in places that must legally comply with FIPS. What it gives you is a system that refuses to use cryptography outside the FIPS-approved set - one of the first steps toward the full FIPS scope in future updates.

More details: https://vyos.dev/T8529

Cryptography does not stand still, and neither do we. IPsec in VyOS now offers post-quantum key exchange: ML-KEM algorithms (mlkem512, mlkem768, mlkem1024) can be selected in IKE and ESP group proposals, protecting your tunnels from "harvest now, decrypt later" attacks, where encrypted traffic is recorded today to be decrypted by quantum computers in the future. In addition to that, we added a CLI for Extended Sequence Numbers (ESN) in IKE and ESP group proposals with flexible negotiation - you can make ESN required, optional, or disabled, and VyOS will build proposals that interoperate correctly with both ESN-capable and non-ESN peers.

More details: https://vyos.dev/T8099, https://vyos.dev/T8097

Additionally, we have improved TPM-enabled encrypted configuration support with a small fix that prevents Cloud-init from breaking after encryption is activated in instances deployed with it. This is a minor change, but it makes using the feature in clouds more stable.

More details: https://vyos.dev/T8344

There are also other small fixes, like enabling code security scanning for more components in the system to catch issues before they even land in binaries.

You may also have spotted new artifacts in the latest rolling releases (https://github.com/vyos/vyos-nightly-build/releases/) - cdx.json and spdx.json files. For those of you who are already familiar with SBOM, they do not need any introduction, but for the rest of you, we would like to explain how these small additions may change your deployments and maintenance.

You may trust the vendor, but a flood of security incidents in past years, many of which involved third-party dependency poisoning techniques, should have put you on alert already. There are many actions that vendors take to protect customers from such problems, but there is also something customers may do as well - understand what risks they are exposed to and track these risks actively. This is where the Software Bill of Materials, or SBOM, steps in. This is the inventory list of a system or application, which answers the question of what components it consists of. This knowledge allows you to trigger actions on incoming security-related information, like new public vulnerability disclosures, even before a vendor issues a new security note or fix, as well as to perform a security and license analysis of the product before even launching it for the first time. The ecosystem of tools around SBOM is wide and well established - check it out if you have not used it yet; it opens wide opportunities for improving software management.

Being committed to full transparency for customers, we are now offering SBOMs for rolling images in two formats: CycloneDX (cdx.json) and SPDX (spdx.json).

Deprecations

We have supported the Salt automation framework for many years across multiple LTS versions, but as we noted in the blog last year (https://blog.vyos.io/vyos-project-november-2025-update), it was decided to remove the integration from the system due to an almost total lack of interest from customers. Now the action has been taken, and starting from 2026-06-10, new rolling builds do not have the feature anymore. If you need automation integrations, we recommend paying attention to our Ansible collection (https://github.com/vyos/vyos.vyos), which we actively maintain.

Community Activities

VyOS could not be built without our community, and here are some of the changes introduced by community members that we would like to highlight specifically:

  • https://vyos.dev/T8761, https://github.com/vyos/vyos-1x/pull/5167
    Optimizations are good, but sometimes with optimizations, new bugs may be introduced. In this case, our contributor tracked down an issue with firewall configuration, introduced in one of the previous optimizations, that impacted the zone-based firewall's capability to filter outgoing packets in VRF configurations.
  • https://vyos.dev/T9022, https://github.com/vyos/vyos-1x/pull/5296
    Sometimes features work technically correctly, but in an inconvenient way. And this change is an exceptionally good example of how the community helps to tackle such problems. VyOS HTTPS service users with certificates that are issued by an intermediate CA may have seen that some HTTPS clients do not like to establish a connection. This took place because the HTTPS server did not provide the full chain of certificates - an oversight that did not break the feature, but clearly made it less pleasant. The fix updates this behavior, and now the HTTPS service provides the full chain of certificates to clients - from the root CA to the server certificate - which restores trust in it.
  • https://vyos.dev/T8975, https://github.com/vyos/vyos-1x/pull/5264
    Many issues are hidden so deeply that finding them is possible only in very specific situations or environments, but this does not make these issues less important or dangerous. During past years, we had a few desynchronizations in that area which led to a mismatch between the VTI interface status and the SA state, and they were fixed. But as it turned out, not completely - this fix completes the picture by avoiding race conditions that may occur during intensive IPsec renegotiations, which ultimately makes IPsec work more stably.
  • https://vyos.dev/T8990, https://github.com/vyos/vyos-1x/pull/5287
    Sometimes a whole class of trouble comes down to a single word. Users of VRF route leaking via VPNv4/VPNv6 address families experienced short traffic interruptions on every commit - even commits that had nothing to do with routing at all. The reason was in how the generated FRR configuration is compared with the running one: a route-target line was rendered in a form that FRR accepts on input but never writes back, so on every reload it looked changed, and all leaked routes were withdrawn and reinstalled. A community member got to the bottom of it and made the configuration round-trip cleanly, so leaked routes now stay in place across commits.